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Abstract 
 
We explore the relations between firms’ internal capabilities, national governance quality (NGQ) 
and performance in the African context using a dataset comprised of 11,183 firm-year observations (1,490 
unique firms from 15 African countries over a 17-year period). Our study offers new insights into how 
interlinkages between firms’ internal and external environment, shape corporate success. Specifically, we 
find that (1) firms’ internal capabilities (captured by financial resource-availability and growth prospects) 
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are critical enablers of performance in both weak and strong institutional environments, (2) individual 
firms perform well in environments where their peers performs well, (3) NGQ directly enhances aggregate 
firm performance, and in tandem, the performance of  individual firms, and (4) NGQ moderates the 
capability-performance nexus, by enhancing the translation of growth opportunities into profitability. The 
results highlight the critical role of firm-level financial resource availability and growth prospects in 
shaping corporate success in this challenging institutional environment. 
Keywords: firm performance, national governance quality, internal capabilities, Africa. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Organisational performance may be influenced by many forms of internal capabilities including 
organisational slack (Wiersma, 2017), borrowing capacity (Vo, 2018), liquidity (Yang et al., 2017; French 
and Taborda, 2018), capital structure (Le and Phan, 2017; Detthamrong et al., 2017) and growth 
opportunities (Agyei-Boapeah et al., 2018; Li and Kuo, 2017). However, the ultimate impact of firms’ 
internal capabilities on performance is still debatable as the results of prior empirical studies vary with the 
types of internal capabilities examined and the context of the study. For instance, Agyei-Boapeah et al. 
(2018) provide evidence to suggest a positive impact of internal capabilities on the performance of British 
acquiring firms, while Yang et al. (2017) document a negative effect of firm internal capabilities on 
organisational performance by showing that highly liquid Chinese firms undertake value-destroying M&A 
deals. Furthermore, for a sample of US firms, Wiersma (2017) shows that firm capabilities (discretionary 
slack) has both positive and negative effects on performance.  
Most prior studies on the capabilities-performance nexus share some common features, which may 
partly explain the mixed evidence they report, and offer us avenues to contribute to this strand of the 
literature. First, in the absence of a single, widely accepted proxy for firms’ internal capabilities, each 
study focuses on a specific type of internal capability, mostly financial, ignoring other forms of capabilities 
in their analysis. Meanwhile, Barney (1991) offers a broader definition of capabilities as a pool of 
organisational resources that encompasses managerial skills/abilities, organisational culture/dynamism, 
technological know-how, innovation and financial capabilities. In view of this definition, the current 
article seeks to contribute to the literature on firm capabilities-performance nexus by utilising an array of 
empirical proxies that captures both financial and non-financial aspects of firms’ internal capabilities. 
Through this approach, our study offers a more comprehensive view of firms’ internal capabilities, 
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allowing us to robustly investigate the underlying relationship between firm capabilities and performance, 
and in the process, enhance our understanding on the subject.  
Second, a majority of the existing studies are conducted within a single country context, limiting the 
generalisability of prior findings. It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, prevailing macro-
environments moderate the results of prior studies on the capabilities-performance nexus. We address this 
concern by examining the impact of firm internal capabilities on performance in a cross-country 
framework that involves 15 African countries. Besides the obvious advantage of generating more 
generalisable results, our cross-country analysis has an additional benefit of producing more powerful 
statistical results by exploiting time-series, as well as cross-sectional variations at both the firm- and 
country-levels.  
Third, we leverage on the significant variations in the quality of governance across African countries 
(see Figure 1) to explore the direct effect of national governance quality (NGQ) on firm performance, as 
well as the moderating role of NGQ on the firm capabilities-performance nexus. We motivate this part of 
our analysis using institutional theory (McGahan and Porter, 1997) and the strategy tripod perspective 
(Peng et al., 2009). To our knowledge, this makes our study one of the first in the capabilities-performance 
literature to explore how firms’ internal and external environments interact to shape their performance. 
We thus extend the literature to show how NGQ enhances or dampens the effect of firm capabilities on 
performance. Additionally, our cross-country context allows us to address an important issue—why some 
firms continuously perform well despite institutional constraints. 
Finally, we contribute more broadly to the literature on corporate performance by positioning our 
study in the African setting, which remains relatively understudied. Our focus on the African market is 
significant, partly because much of the literature on corporate performance focuses almost exclusively on 
the European (Hawawini et al. 2004) and Asian (Makino et al., 2004; Contractor et al. 2007; Chari and 
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Banalieva, 2015) institutional contexts, with the African context (Ngobo and Fouda, 2012) largely 
ignored. Meanwhile, the African continent, which is characterised by diversity in institutional quality 
(Areneke and Kimani, 2018), has experienced tremendous growth over the last two decades (Hearn, 2015).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Similarly, recent years have seen some improvements in governance in many African countries 
(Areneke et al., 2019), although some challenges remain. As can be seen from Figure 1, while countries 
such as Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana, Namibia, and South Africa exhibit high governance scores2, others 
like Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have poor scores. While this observation is widely 
documented (Biggs and Shah, 2006; Hearn, 2015), it remains unclear how this evolution and cross-country 
differences in institutional quality shape firm outcomes. Besides allowing us to explain the growth 
witnessed by African firms in recent years, this cross-country context, characterised by significant 
variability in NGQ, allows us to explore the impact of NGQ on the capability-performance nexus.3  
Several other reasons make our chosen African context an interesting setting to undertake this study. 
In recent years, the African continent has gained increased prominence on the global front in terms of its 
contribution to the global economy. International Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP statistics over the 1996 to 
2012 period suggest that average growth in sub-Sahara Africa (4.6%) dwarfed OECD member countries 
(2.1%) and the rest of the World (2.8%). Therefore, shifting more research attention to Africa by way of 
understanding the recent growth in the region, is warranted.  
While Africa has enjoyed a significant inflow of foreign direct investment over the last decade, 
management research on Africa is still at its infancy (Areneke et al., 2019). Prior research on antecedents 
                                                 
2 We discuss the generation of these scores later in our study. 
3 A western context (e.g., the European Union) will be characterised by countries with similar levels of governance quality, 
which does not change markedly over time. This lack of variability means it will be empirically difficult to tease out the impact 
of an increase in governance quality on aggregate firm performance. 
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of performance in African firms, for example, has primarily focused on small & medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs) and non-listed firms (Ramachandran and Shah, 1999; Biggs and Shah, 2006; Ngobo and Fouda, 
2012). Thus, there is limited understanding about listed African firms, which typically tend to be larger, 
better governed, and form part of an international network (e.g. subsidiaries of well-established global 
companies).  
Based on a large dataset of 1,490 listed African firms drawn from 15 African countries over a 17-
year period spanning 1996-2012 (i.e., an unbalanced panel of 11,183 firm-year observations), we uncover 
the following four key findings. Firstly, we show that financial resources (i.e., a combination of high free 
cash flow, high liquidity and low leverage) and growth opportunities (i.e., a combination of low book to 
market values, high sales growth and low firm age) generally enhance a firm’s performance and increases 
its likelihood of outperforming its peers.  Secondly, we show that although our results on the capabilities-
performance relation hold in both weak and strong governance environments, the relationship is stronger 
in better governance environments. Our finding of a positive capabilities-performance link in weak 
governance environments suggests that firms operating in poor governance environments use their 
superior capabilities to mitigate external institutional challenges. These results, in combination with 
additional case evidence, explain why some African firms perform well despite institutional constraints. 
Finally, we show that an improvement in country-level institutional environment directly enhances 
aggregate firm performance and, in tandem, the performance of individual firms. 
Collectively, our main results suggest that internal capabilities and NGQ are two critical sources of 
competitive advantage for listed African firms and hence, differences in their distribution, partly, explain 
variations in performance across firms, countries and over time. Our results imply that firms’ internal 
capabilities are critical to individual firms’ performance in both strong and weak institutional 
environments. While an abundance in natural resources at the macro-level (Mehlum et al., 2006) leads to 
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negative outcomes in Africa —the resource curse— it appears that, high internal capabilities/resources at 
the firm-level yield net benefits to firms, irrespective of the quality of underlying institutions.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We discuss our hypotheses in section 2.0, research 
design, variable selection and data, in section 3.0, empirical findings in section 4.0 and conclude our study 
in section 5.0. 
2.0 Hypotheses development  
2.1 The strategy tripod perspective 
While the resource-based view is powerful, it does not sufficiently explain strategy and performance in 
complex institutional settings (Peng et al., 2009; Su et al., 2016).  The strategy tripod (Peng et al., 2009) 
provides a theoretical framework for this study. The framework suggests that firm performance in an 
international setting is driven by a complex mix of internal firm resources and capabilities (resource-based 
view), industry characteristics (industry-based view) and the quality of institutions (institution-based 
view). The nature of these factors and the channels through which they influence strategy and performance 
are subject to debate (Meyer et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2010; Su et al., 2016), hence, we explore their 
interlinkages in a novel (African) setting. That is, we draw from this theoretical perspective, and an 
African institutional context to explore the role of: (1) firm financial resources and growth potential 
(resource-based factors); (2) the performance of peer firms (industry-based factor); and (3) governance 
quality (institutional-based factor) on the performance of firms. Our conceptual model is shown in Figure 
2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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2.2 Internal capabilities 
Grant (1991) contends that firm-specific resources could be tangible (e.g., financial resources) or 
intangible (e.g., skills, reputation, brands, networks and goodwill), and the differences in endowment of 
these resources explain differences in performance across firms. Consistent with this view, prior research 
draws on the resource-based view (RBV) to explain why firm performance varies across firms and over 
time (Gerschewski et al., 2015). RBV emphasises the importance of firm idiosyncratic resources and 
capabilities, particularly those that reside within the organisation, in shaping firms’ competitive advantage, 
and hence, performance (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). This theory suggests that under 
certain circumstances, firms derive competitive advantage and enjoy superior performance through their 
ownership and control of specific firm resources including technological know-how, management skills, 
access to finance and raw materials, amongst others (Barney, 1991; Lee et al., 2001). Given that such 
resources are heterogeneously distributed and not easily transferable across firms, the RBV suggests that 
differences in firm resource endowments (and hence, internal capabilities) can explain variations in firm 
performance.  
The challenge with applying the RBV in different contexts is to identify the specific set of resources 
that drive competitive advantage. Some studies stress the need for “resources” to be valuable, scarce, 
imperfectly tradeable and hard to imitate (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Such resources include routines 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), organisational culture (Fiol, 1991), dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997), 
innovation capability (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), technological know-how and quality control 
capabilities (Lee et al., 2001), amongst others. Hence, researchers adopting the RBV to explain 
performance, perhaps, overly focus on intangible resources as they are more likely to meet these criteria 
(Gerschewski et al., 2015). Financial resources are generally not considered to provide a sustainable 
competitive advantage in the RBV literature because they are neither rare, inimitable nor untradeable 
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(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Lee et al., 2001). Nonetheless, a few studies including Roberts and 
Hauptmann (1987) and Lee et al. (2001) suggest that financial resources can be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage and hence, positively impact firm performance in some specific contexts.  
Emerging economies and their constituent firms often fail to attain high levels of development, 
competitive advantage, and performance partly due to resource limitations (Ngobo and Fouda, 2012). This 
suggests that, in this context, financial resources can be considered valuable (scarce and rare), and hence, 
critical to firm performance. Consequently, firms with more financial resources are, perhaps, more likely 
to pursue major capital investment projects, hire better management teams, engage in marketing 
campaigns, develop networks, acquire technology and fund expansion, distribution, R&D, product and 
market development programmes. Crucially therefore, in this context, financial resources can act as a 
proxy of a firm’s ability to acquire strategic resources and capabilities required to develop and sustain 
competitive advantage. We, therefore, argue that African firms with access to sufficient financial 
resources will maintain a better competitive position, leading to better performance. Other vital, mainly 
intangible, resources and capabilities shaping performance in the African context could include 
management skill and ability (Ramachandran and Shah, 1999), firm lifecycle and potential for growth, 
quality of products, brands, networks, goodwill, services and competitive position in the market or 
industry. The importance of these resources and capabilities, and the permutations in which they occur is 
likely to be different from one firm, industry and country to the next. Nonetheless, these resources are 
critical for firm growth and, together, enhance growth prospects or potential. We, hence, focus on growth 
prospects as an envelopment of a variety of other (mainly intangible) firm resources that drive growth by 
converting tangible (financial) resources to unique value-enhancing capabilities (Grant, 1991). Our first 
general hypothesis is stated as follows: 
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H1: Ceteris paribus, African firms with high capabilities (specifically, generated from financial 
resources and growth prospects) perform better relative to those with low capabilities. 
2.3 National governance quality (NGQ) 
RBV looks inside the firm and, hence, does not explain why systematic differences in firm performance 
exist between firms in different institutional environments. Prior studies draw on different perspectives of 
the institutional theory to explain why the performance of firms within the same institutional environment 
may converge and why firms in specific institutional settings appear to do better than their counterparts 
operating elsewhere (Ngobo and Fouda, 2012). Institutional theory suggests that many aspects of firms 
are driven by the desire to achieve institutional fit (i.e., compliance with the structures, routines and 
systems prescribed by institutional norms) within the institutional environment (Volberda et al., 2012).  
Institutional fit facilitates learning, increases legitimacy and the ability to attract high quality 
resources from the institutional environment (Volberda et al., 2012). This suggests that institutional 
pressures may have a significant influence on the performance of firms. Indeed, Hanousek and Kochanova 
(2016), for example, examine the relation between corruption and firm performance in 14 Central and 
Eastern European countries and document that bribery and corruption negatively impacts on firms’ sales 
and labour productivity. Several other studies drawing on the institutional-based view or perspective 
(IBV) show that institutional context affects firm-level behavior (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). Amongst 
others, Williamson (2000) builds on the observation that organisational forms and practices are largely 
heterogeneous across countries due to institutional differences in governance quality. This is even more 
pronounced in emerging economies characterised by institutional voids such as weak enforcement of laws 
and strong informal norms and beliefs (Kim and Ozdemir, 2014; Areneke and Kimani, 2018). Institutional 
voids are detrimental to markets and business growth as they increase firm risk, as well as operating and 
transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Li et al. (2006) find that law enforcement, corporate 
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governance disclosure regulations and shareholder protection across countries affect firm-level decisions, 
and by extension firm-level performance.  
Consequently therefore, NGQ influences firm-level performance, perhaps, through its influence on 
internal governance structures, systems and decisions. High NGQ possibly enhances the protection of 
property rights, boosts investor confidence, facilitates efficient allocation of resources, and ultimately 
creates value for stakeholders. In weak NGQ environments (characterized, for example, by high levels of 
bribery), profitability weakens a firm’s bargaining position (Svensson, 2003; Clarke and Xu, 2004) 
Overall, we argue that firms in high NGQ institutional environments will outperform their counterparts in 
low NGQ environments.4 Our general hypothesis is stated as follows:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, on aggregate, firms in institutional environments with high NGQ perform 
comparatively better than those in institutional environments with low NGQ.  
2.4 The performance of peer firms 
The literature on institutional fit suggests that firms tend to follow the behaviour of other firms perceived 
as “more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This could be by mimicking the 
organisational characteristics and designs that produced positive outcomes in model firms (Haunschild 
and Miner, 1997). Failure to adopt “the norm” could signal “illegitimacy” to stakeholders within the 
institutional context as high-preforming firms are assumed to be effective in conforming to institutional 
requirements of the environment. As such, other firms tend to benchmark themselves in line with high-
performing peers, resulting in a high fit within the institutional context. Empirical evidence shows a 
positive effect between conformity through mimetic process (i.e., institutional fit) and firm-level 
                                                 
4We do not argue that national governance is the only factor in the institutional environment which impacts on firm 
performance. Indeed, there is some evidence that other factors such as locational advantages and the level of stock market 
development are important to business development and growth (Tunyi and Ntim, 2016). Accordingly, our empirical analysis 
controls for such factors. 
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performance (e.g.  Heugens and Lander, 2009). Consistent with this view, we argue that through a mimetic 
process, firms are likely to perform well when other firms (peers) within their institutional environment 
perform well. This hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between individual firm performance and the 
performance of peer firms in the African context. 
2.5 The moderating effect of NGQ  
Our final hypothesis focuses on the mediating role of NGQ on the firm capabilities-performance nexus. 
Our first hypothesis (H1) argues that firms’ internal capabilities are positively associated with 
performance. While we control for several firm-specific factors, we do not consider how the institutional 
context can mediate this relationship. Further, in our second hypothesis (H2), we argue that firm 
performance will increase with the quality of national governance. Taken together, H1 and H2 suggest 
that both firm capabilities (H1) and a suitable institutional environment (H2) are important for firm 
performance. It may be the case that firms endowed with an abundance of internal firm resources and 
capabilities in weak institutional environments are unlikely to perform optimally. In weak NGQ 
environments, for example, firms may deliberately structure operations to report low profitability in order 
to reduce their liability and exposure to corrupt bureaucrats (Clarke and Xu, 2004). Strong NGQ, on the 
contrary, reduces firm risk and uncertainty, provides protection for firms and their investors and increases 
firm incentive to invest in growth enhancing and long-term projects. This implies that we are likely to find 
a stronger link between firm resources/capabilities and firm performance in high NGQ environments. 
Hence, we argue that internal capabilities and resources are better translated into superior performance in 
high NGQ environments. Consequently, our final hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, national governance quality (NGQ) moderates the relationship between firm 
capabilities and performance. 
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It is also plausible for some firms to perform very well in weak NGQ environments. Such firms may 
be able to use their financial resources and capabilities to circumvent the challenges of operating in 
particularly difficult environments. We therefore expect that top-performers in difficult environments will 
have significant financial resources and growth opportunities. 
3.0 Data and methodology 
3.1 Research design 
We explore several models of performance that directly address our research hypotheses. To directly 
address H1, we model firm performance within each country as a function of firms’ capabilities as in 
equation (1). In equation (2), we address H2 by modeling the aggregate performance (proxied by median 
performance)5 of firms in a country as a function of NGQ. In equation (3), we explore whether there is a 
direct relationship between individual firm performance and NGQ, as suggested by H2. In equation (4), 
we address H3, by exploring the relationship between a firm’s performance and the performance of peer 
firms (proxied by median performance). Finally, in equation (5), we use standard interaction effects to 
explore whether NGQ moderates the relation between firms’ capabilities and performance, as suggested 
by H4. Our baseline models are present below: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑛
+ 𝛿𝑖
+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑛
+ 𝛿𝑗 + 𝑗𝑡 
(2) 
 
                                                 
5 In additional analyses, we use mean values and find qualitatively similar results. 
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑛
+ 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
 (3) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛
+𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛
+𝛿𝑖
+ 𝑖𝑡 
(5) 
 
In equations (1) to (5), the subscripts i, j, and t refer to firm-specific, country-specific, and time-
specific characteristics, respectively. For robustness, we explore our results across several estimation 
strategies. Firstly, we run panel regression models with fixed effects where 𝛽𝑛 are coefficients of the 
respective independent variables, 𝛿 capture firm, country and time fixed effects, and εit is a time-varying 
error term. The fixed effects models allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity while also 
controlling for omitted variable bias.6 Secondly, consistent with Tunyi et al. (2019), we partly address 
potential endogeneity issues (simultaneity) by lagging all our independent variables by one financial year. 
Thirdly, to derive more efficient estimates (robust to simultaneity and omitted variable biases), we use the 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) generalized method‐ of‐ moments (GMM) estimator to re-estimate our 
results. 
                                                 
6 In each case, we first conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to inform our selection of fixed over random effect panel regression 
specification. In additional tests, we derive (panel) logit probability models where we explore factors that may increase the 
likelihood that a firm reports a performance above a threshold value. Our conclusions do not change. We do not present these 
models here, for conciseness. 
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3.2 Data and variables 
Our sample for empirical analysis covers 15 African countries with thriving stock markets (see Table 1). 
We exclude countries such as Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Libya and Sudan which have a stock market but 
no available data for listed firms. From the Thomson DataStream database, we first generate the list of all 
live and dead firms listed in these stock exchanges. We then identify suitable proxies for our constructs 
based on prior research (Danbolt et al. 2016; Tunyi et al., 2019). Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1.  
The dependent variable in our models is firm performance. For robustness, we explore alternative 
accounting and stock market measures of performance including return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), return on sales (ROS), operating margin (OPM) and average abnormal return (AAR). Prior research 
suggests a high correlation between accounting measures of performance (Danbolt et al. 2016; Tunyi et 
al., 2019). Consistent with Elamer et al. (2017), we use ROA as our main measure of performance as it 
draws information from both the income statement and statement of financial position and is more 
analytically tractable when compared to ROE, particularly for firms with “negative” book value of equity.  
To measure firms’ financial resources, we use three accounting variables including firm-level free 
cash flow (FCF), liquidity (LIQ), and leverage (LEV). As will be discussed, the correlation between these 
variables is low as each variable captures a different dimension of the construct. A combination of high 
FCF and/or high LIQ and a low LEV will be indicative of high resources/capabilities. A low LEV implies 
that a firm has low interest commitments and limited debt covenants meaning that it has more flexibility 
to use the financial resources at its disposal. We also use three accounting variables including book to 
market value (BTM), sales growth (SGR) and firm age (AGE) to capture growth opportunities or prospects. 
A low book to market value, as well as, high sales growth is indicative future growth opportunities 
(Danbolt et al., 2016; Li and Kuo, 2017). Further, younger firms generally have newer technologies, 
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innovative products, contemporary business models, modern assets, and less rigid organisational 
structures and hence, greater opportunities for growth when compared to their older counterparts (Danbolt 
et al., 2016). 
In the first instance, measures of firm resources (FCF, LIQ, LEV) and growth prospects (BTM, SGR, 
AGE) are included in our models as stand-alone independent variables and we interpret results by looking 
at the combination of variables. Additionally, we develop two proxies to capture individual firms’ variable 
configurations of resources and growth opportunities. Our proxy for financial resources (high-resource 
dummy, HRES) takes a value of 1 if a firm has LIQ and FCF above the country-year median and its LEV 
is below the country-year median. Otherwise, HRES takes a value of zero. Similarly, our proxy for growth 
opportunities (high growth dummy, HGRW) takes a value of 1 if a firm’s SGR is above the country-year 
median and its BTM and AGE are below the country-year median. Otherwise, HGRW takes a value of 
zero. We use these composite measures (HRES, HGRW) in place of the independent accounting variables 
in additional tests. We collect data on our firms’ accounting variables including measures of firm 
profitability, abnormal stock market return, firm valuation, free cash flow, leverage, liquidity, sales 
growth, tangibility, size and age (detailed in Appendix 1) from Thomson DataStream. Our panel dataset 
covers the 17-year period from 1996 to 2012.7 As detailed in Table 1, the dataset constitutes 1,490 unique 
African listed firms and 11,183 firm-year observations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
 
Our main country-level variable is NGQ which measures the quality of the external institutional 
environment under which firms operate. Following Elamer et al. (2017) and Konara and Shirodkar (2018), 
we use the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2010) to capture 
                                                 
7 We start from 1996 as data on World Governance Indicators (WGI) is only available from 1996. 
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NGQ. WGI (available via WorldBank.org) provides six cross-country time varying scores (indices) for 
items including Control of Corruption (CCI), Government Effectiveness (GEI), Voice and Accountability 
(VAI), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAVI), Regulatory Quality (RQI) and Rule of Law 
(ROLI). These six variables, while highly correlated, capture different facets of national governance 
(Kaufmann et al. 2010).8 Following Konara and Shirodkar (2018), we use Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) to reduce the six national governance indices (CCI, GEI, VAI, PSVAI, RQI and ROLI) into one 
component (National Governance Quality Composite, NGQC) which we use in our multivariate analysis.9 
In addition, we construct a simple NGQ index (of indices) using the six national governance indices as 
our input variables. Notice that the Cronbach alpha measuring internal consistency between these six items 
is 0.95 with an average interterm correlation of 0.30. For simplicity, we allocate an equal weighting to 
these six indices (given that they have the same range). Our NGQ index (NGQI) is therefore simply the 
arithmetic mean of the six indices. Its distribution is, hence, similar to that of any of the 6 constituent 
indices with possible minimum and maximum values of -2.5 and +2.5, respectively. As we will show, our 
results remain unchanged when we use NGQI or NGQC as our measure of NGQ.10 
In our regression models, we control for firm-specific factors that might influence performance 
including measures of operating efficiency (such as salary to sales ratio, SALS), measures of capital 
investments (including property, plant and equipment to total asset ratio, TANG) and measures of firm 
size (natural log of total assets, SIZE). This addresses research documenting that firm performance 
increases with operating efficiency (SALS) and capital investment (TANG) in the long run but declines 
                                                 
8 Kaufmann et al. (2010, p.4) link the six measures to three important governance areas including: (i) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced (VAI, PSAVI); (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies (GEI, RQI); and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them (ROLI, CCI). 
9PCA results are available on request. Eigenvalues suggest that the first principal component captures over 85% of the variance 
explained by each component, hence, we only use this component in our main analysis. 
10 Indeed, the two measures have a correlation coefficient (rho) of 99.9%. 
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with capital investment in the short run (Baik et al., 2013). Finally, given our African sample, we control 
for cross-listing (CROSS) following evidence that cross-listed firms from emerging markets enjoy better 
access to capital and hence, better value (Esqueda, 2017). These variables are fully defined in Panel D of 
Appendix 1. Notice that CROSS is a firm fixed effect and hence, does not enter into our fixed effects and 
GMM model specifications. Hence, later in our study, we conduct additional subsample (robustness) 
analyses to address the impact of cross-listing.  
Following Tunyi and Ntim (2016), we also control for several country-level drivers of performance 
including measures of locational advantages (market size and market growth) and measures of stock 
market development (market capitalisation, market volatility and firm concentration). Demand and hence, 
firm performance, will perhaps be higher in larger markets (market size) and in periods of growth (market 
growth). Firms in more developed (stock market capitalisation), as well as, active markets (market 
volatility) can access external financing more easily, hence, might have less reliance on internal financial 
resources. Finally, a high concentration (firm concentration) of firms can spur competition and innovation 
with potentially positive effects on aggregate performance. These variables are fully defined in Panel E of 
Appendix 1. Our panel fixed effects specification allows us to control for any unobserved cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in firms and countries (which is constant over time). 
4.0 Results and discussions 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
We first explore the financial characteristics of African firms. We present descriptive statistics for firm 
financial characteristics for the pooled sample in Appendix 2. In untabulated results, we also explore 
variations in firm financial characteristics across countries and over time.11 The results generally show a 
                                                 
11 These country and year-level descriptive statistics (untabulated for conciseness) are available on request. 
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wide variation, specifically with respect to firm performance, across these countries (see Figure 3). Over 
the period 1996 to 2012, as shown in Appendix 2, listed firms in Africa achieve a mean (median) ROA of 
about 5.6% (5.3%). As shown in Figure 3, countries such as Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania report 
comparatively higher mean (median) ROAs of 9.4% (7.8%), 10.6% (10.5%) and 13.5% (21.2%), 
respectively. Other countries including Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius report modest mean 
(median) ROAs of 3.5% (2.3%), 4.1% (3.8%), 4.5% (3.8%) and 4.6% (3.3%), respectively. In Appendix 
4 and Figure 1, we establish the existence of wide between-country variation in NGQ across African 
countries, depicting the peculiarity of this context.  
 [Insert Figure 3 about here]  
Using a univariate framework, we further explore firm-level drivers of performance by comparing 
the characteristics of well-performing firms (test sample) to those of their underperforming counterparts 
(control sample) in Table 2. We consider well-performing firms as those with performance above zero 
(ROA>0, AAR>0) in the first instance, and performance above the median performance (ROA>mROA, 
AAR>mAAR) in the second instance. That is, in models 1 and 3, we compare the characteristics of firms 
with performance above zero to firms with performance below zero. Then, in models 2 and 4, we compare 
the characteristics of firms with above-median performance to firms with below-median performance. For 
conciseness, we only report the difference in means for well-performing minus underperforming firms. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here]  
  
In general, the results suggest the existence of a statistically significant difference in the 
characteristics of well-performing firms when compared to their underperforming counterparts. Compared 
to their underperforming counterparts, well-performing firms have higher levels of resources (i.e., a 
combination of higher FCF, higher LIQ and lower LEV) and higher growth prospects (i.e., a combination 
of lower BTM, higher SGR and lower AGE). These results are robust to our choice of proxies (ROA or 
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AAR) and strategies for identifying well- and underperforming firms (greater than 0, greater than median 
value). In un-tabulated results, we find that our conclusions do not change if we proxy LIQ with the current 
ratio, use Tobin’s Q in place of BTM, or define LEV as the ratio of long term debt to equity. We do not 
report these results for conciseness. These preliminary results suggest that, consistent with our first 
hypothesis (H1), firms which hold higher levels of resources and have better growth prospects, tend to 
perform better than their counterparts. We will reassess this in a multivariate setting (controlling for other 
determinants of performance) in section 4.2. Our second hypothesis (H2) explores the relation between 
NGQ and firms’ performance. Our measures for NGQ (i.e., NGQC and NGQI) are derived from the World 
Bank’s WGIs (see Appendix 1 panel C for a description of these variables). In Appendix 4 and Figure 1, 
we present descriptive statistics (means) of our measures of NGQ (NGQI and NGQC) as well as the 6 
fundamental WGIs across the 15 countries in our sample. Ivory Coast (ICoast), Nigeria and Zimbabwe 
have the lowest levels of NGQ on average, while Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa 
(SAfrica) report the highest levels of NGQ.  
 
4.2 Internal capabilities and firm performance 
In Appendix 3, we explore pairwise correlations and variance inflation factors (VIF) for our firm- (panel 
A) and country-level (panel B) independent variables. We also compute VIF for our other firm- and 
country-level variables. While the correlation coefficients (rho) between several independent variables are 
significant (at least at the 10% level), the magnitude of rho is, perhaps, not large enough to be of concern. 
Additionally, we find that VIFs are below the threshold for multicollinearity to be a concern. Importantly, 
the correlation between our measures for firm financial resources (i.e., FCF, LIQ, LEV) and growth 
prospects (BTM, SGR, AGE) are quite low. This supports our assertion that these variables capture distinct 
dimensions of financial resource availability and growth prospects, hence, their combination in empirical 
analyses leads to a more comprehensive measure of these constructs.  
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In our multivariate analyses, we use ROA as our main performance measure.12 We run a number of 
panel and logit regression models with fixed effects, as well as, dynamic GMM models to explore the 
relation between firms’ internal capabilities and performance. Model (1) in Table 3,  explores the relation 
between performance, measures of financial resources (FCF, LIQ, LEV) and measures of growth 
opportunities (BTM, SGR, AGE)  using a panel regression with fixed effects framework. Model (2) is 
similar to model (1) but uses lagged independent variables to partly address endogeneity (reverse-
causality) issues. Model (3) is a logit model which estimates the probability of reporting a positive ROA13 
as a function of firm resources and growth opportunities. Model (4) is a dynamic GMM model14. Model 
(5) explores alternative measures of financial resources and growth opportunities (i.e., HRES and HGRW) 
using an OLS framework (with Huber-White standard errors). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The results from models (1) to (4) generally show that, consistent with H1, performance is positively 
associated with firm financial resources (i.e., increases with FCF and LIQ and decreases with LEV) and 
positively associated with growth prospects (i.e., increases with SGR and declines with BTM and AGE).  
In model 1, for example, everything remaining constant, a unit increase in FCF (LIQ) is associated with 
an 18.9% (8.7%) increase in ROA while a unit decrease in leverage is associated with a 0.6% increase in 
ROA. Similarly, everything remaining constant, a unit decrease in BTM (AGE) is associated with a 0.3% 
(1.3%) increase in ROA while a unit increase in SGR is associated with a 3.9% increase in ROA. The 
results from the fixed effect and logit regressions (models 1 and 3) are generally significant at the 1% 
                                                 
12 As will be discussed, we run robustness tests using alternative measures. Our results are robust to the choice of proxy for 
firm performance. 
13 In untabulated results, we also estimate the probability of reporting a profit above the median of all firms in that year. 
14 We conduct the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors and find that the moment conditions 
for use of dynamic GMM are satisfied. There is a first order serial correlation (p-value of 0.000) of the differenced errors but 
not a second order correlation (p-value of 0.651). 
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level (p-value of 0.000). In model (2), LEV, BTM and AGE lose significance when we apply lagged 
independent variables but the signs of the coefficients are consistent with expectations. The results from 
the GMM specification (model 4) are also consistent with expectations and are qualitatively similar to the 
results from models 1 and 2. In model (5), we use alternative proxies to capture constructs of financial 
resources (high resource dummy, HRES) and growth opportunities (high growth dummy, HGRW). The 
results show that, consistent with our hypothesis (H1), these alternative measures of firm resources 
(HRES) and firm growth opportunities (HGRW) are positively associated with firm performance (ROA). 
A unit increase in HRES (HGRW) is associated with a 5.8 % (4.1%) increase in ROA.  
Overall, our results are consistent with our hypothesis (H1), as they show that high firm financial 
resources (i.e., high FCF, high LIQ and low LEV) and high growth opportunities (i.e., low BTM, high SGR 
and low AGE) generally enhance a firm’s performance (models 1, 2 and 4), increases its likelihood of 
reporting a profit (i.e., ROA>0 in model 3), as well as, its likelihood of outperforming the median firm 
(i.e., ROA > median ROA in untabulated results). This suggests that these internal capabilities are vital 
and critical to the development of competitive advantage. While these results seem inconsistent with Yang 
et al. (2017) who examine the Chinese context, they are in line with the UK study by Agyei-Boapeah et 
al. (2018). The results suggest that, in the presence of limited external financing due to weak financial 
markets (i.e., the African context), internal capabilities (internal financing and growth opportunities) 
enhance performance and competitive advantage. Our findings are robust to several controls including 
measures of firm size (SIZE), capital investment (TANG) and operating efficiency (SALS). Our models 
also account for firm fixed effects inherent in our panel data. Our dynamic GMM model and the use of 
lagged values, partly controls for typical endogeneity issues.   
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
24 
 
4.3 National governance quality, peer performance and firm performance 
In model 1 of Table 4, we test hypothesis H2 by exploring the relation between mean firm performance 
and NGQ using panel fixed- (country) effects models based on equation (2). Our dependent variable in 
model (1) is the median performance (mROA) of listed firms in each country in each year15 and our main 
independent variable is NGQ (measured using NGQC and NGQI)16. The model controls for other potential 
(country-level) drivers of firm performance including market size, growth, capitalization, volatility and 
firm concentration (see Panel E of Appendix 1 for further details). The coefficients of these controls are 
suppressed for conciseness. The results show that, consistent with H2, NGQ is positively related to firm 
performance.17 In essence, a unit increase in NGQ is associated with a 0.3% increase in aggregate 
performance (as measured by the median ROA). This suggests that firms in well-governed country-years 
generally outperform their counterparts in poorly-governed country-years. These results are consistent 
with prior empirical studies which highlight the importance of NGQ for firm success (Ngobo and Fouda, 
2012; Bhaumik et al., 2018; Tunyi and Ntim, 2016).  
[Insert Table 4 about here]  
In models (2) and (3) of Table 4, we stretch our analyses by exploring whether NGQ and 
performance are related at the firm-level—not just at the country-level. Following equation (3), we model 
a firm’s performance as a function of its internal capabilities and the external environment. In model (2), 
we explore the relation between NGQ (NGQC) and firm performance (ROA) using panel fixed (firm) 
effects models and in model (3) we conduct a re-test using lagged independent variables. The results from 
                                                 
15 We also use the average performance of listed firms in a firm’s industry in each year as an alternative proxy but results 
remain qualitatively similar. 
16 The results from NGQC and NGQI are similar (since these variables have a 99.9% correlation) so we only present results 
from NGQC. 
17 In untabulated results, we explore the relation between mean firm performance and components of NGQ. Similarly, we find 
that mean firm performance increases with improvements in the control of corruption (CCI), voice and accountability (VAI) 
and political stability and the absence of violence (PSAVI). We find a positive relation with other WGI (i.e., government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law) but the results are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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models (2) and (3) are qualitatively similar. The results show that, after controlling for firm- and country-
level determinants of firm performance, NGQ has a positive impact on firm-level performance as a unit 
increase in NGQC is associated with a 1% increase in firm’s ROA. The results are significant at a 5% 
level.  
In our computation of mROA, we use the sample of all firms within a firm’s country while excluding 
the firm in question. This allows us to directly explore the relation between a firm’s performance (ROA) 
and the performance of all the other firms within the country (mROA)18 as in models (4) and (5) of Table 
4. We find a positive relation between firm performance (ROA) and the median performance of peer firms 
(mROA). This relationship is robust to our estimation techniques (panel fixed effects in model 4 and GMM 
in model 5) and to our set of control variables (firm and country-specific)19. While we are cautious not to 
claim causation, our evidence of association has been controlled for several other firm- and country-level 
factors which might potentially explain performance, yet our findings remain robust. The results suggest 
that firms do well when their peers do well. In economic terms, a unit increase in peers’ performance is 
associated with a 57.5 % (model 4) to 60.6% (model 5) increase in a firm’s performance. This association 
does not appear to be driven by our firm- and country-level control variables (see Panels B, D and E of 
Appendix 1). This provides some evidence in support of our third hypothesis (H3).  
4.4 The moderating effect of national governance quality 
While we argue that governance quality impacts on performance of firms, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that many firms do well in weak institutional environments. To illustrate this point, in Figure 4, we plot 
                                                 
18 We have also considered the performance of all firms within a firm’s industry while excluding the firm in question, and the 
results are qualitatively similar. 
19 For robustness, we do not include NGQ in this model as this might result in multicollinearity issues—our previous results 
show significant association between mROA and NGQ. However, the results do not qualitatively change when we do so. 
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the long-term average and median ROA for the top five performers in each country.20 The figure shows 
that the top firms in Egypt, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Kenya (i.e., countries with low NGQ) are amongst 
the best performers in the continent. We outline the top five performers in the countries with the weak 
institutional environments (Egypt, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Kenya) and provide some background 
information about their principal shareholders in Appendix 5.21 Notice that Nigeria has one of the weakest 
institutional environments per our measures (an NGQC of -4.419). Nonetheless, firms such as Nestle 
Nigeria PLC and Dangote Sugar Refinery have consistently performed well with the former reporting a 
long run ROA of 22.8% and the latter, a long run ROA of 19.2%. These two firms are backed by significant 
resources; Nestle Nigeria is a partly-owned subsidiary of one of the world’s largest food producers (Nestle 
S.A Switzerland), while Dangote Sugar Refinery is a subsidiary of Dangote Group (largely owned by the 
wealthiest African; Aliko Dangote). This is not unique to the Nigeria market. For example, East African 
Breweries—the top performing Kenyan firm with long run ROA of 19.7% over 9 years—is a subsidiary 
of Diageo PLC (one of the world’s largest distillers of alcoholic beverages) and SAPH—the top 
performing firm in Ivory Coast with long run ROA of 20.9% over 7 years—is largely owned by Michelin 
Group (one of the world’s largest automobile tyre manufacturers). These cases (see Appendix 5) provide 
some anecdotal evidence that financial resources are critical to sustaining performance in weak 
governance contexts. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
                                                 
20 That is, we first compute the mean (and median) ROA of each firm in each country. Then we rank all firms in each country 
by their mean (median) ROA and identify the five best performers. The figure reports the average (of average) and median (of 
median) ROA of these five firms. 
21 Appendix 4 reports measures of the quality of the institutional environment (NGQC & NGQI) across countries. We do not 
focus on Zimbabwe due to its hyperinflation problems over the last decade. We also do not focus on Zambia and Uganda in 
this analysis due to insufficient observations. 
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In model (1) of Table 5, we empirically explore whether besides impacting performance at the firm 
level (H2), NGQ moderates the firm capabilities-performance nexus (H4) following equation (5). This 
can help us explain why some firms in weak institutional environments still perform well. The interaction 
terms in the model (NGQC*HRES and NGQC*HGRW) are positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This suggests that firm capabilities-performance relationship is sensitive to the level of NGQ. In 
essence, consistent with our fourth hypothesis (H4), firms are better able to translate capabilities into 
performance in strong institutional environments. 
In developing our fourth hypothesis (H4), we suggested that the moderating effect of NGQ on the 
capabilities-performance nexus is likely to be stronger for growth prospects than for financial resources 
since firms with sufficient financial resources are better able to shoulder the added risk and costs of 
operating in weak NGQ environments. To explore this issue, we test the relationship between firm 
capabilities (HRES, HGRW) and performance (ROA) across two different subsamples—strong and weak 
NGQ environments or institutional contexts. For robustness, we use alternative strategies to identify weak 
and strong institutional contexts. In our main results (Table 5), we define weak NGQ as country-years 
where NGQC<0, and strong NGQ if otherwise.22 Following Esqueda (2017), we use seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) to compare the coefficients of HRES and HGRW across the two subsamples (strong 
and weak NGQ environments) as in model 2 of Table 5. We find that the coefficient of HRES is marginally 
higher in weak NGQ environments (compared to strong NGQ environments) while the reverse is true for 
HGRW. This suggests that financial resources (HRES) has a relatively stronger (positive) impact on 
performance in weak NGQ environment while growth opportunities (HGRW) are more easily translated 
                                                 
22 Additionally, we have used the median NGQC in each year as a benchmark and results remain robust. In additional tests 
(untabulated for conciseness), based on results in Appendix 4 and Figure 1, we define weak NGQ environments as countries 
with the lowest NGQC scores (including; Egypt, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria) and strong NGQ 
environments as countries with highest NGQC scores (including; Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa). 
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to performance in strong NGQ environments. This is consistent with our earlier suggestions that strong 
institutional environment enhances the translation of growth prospects (HGRW) into performance. The 
results are also consistent with our contention that financial resource-rich firms are better able to shoulder 
the added risk and costs of operating in weak NGQ environments. Overall, our results suggest that firm 
capabilities, particularly, growth opportunities, better translates to firm performance in country-years with 
better governance quality.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.5 Additional analyses and summary of robustness checks 
We conduct two additional analyses. Firstly, we explore whether listing status matters i.e., whether our 
results hold for both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listing is a firm fixed effect hence 
disappears when first difference is considered as in our panel fixed effects and GMM models. Prior studies 
(see, for example, Esqueda, 2017) suggest that cross-listed firms from emerging economies have better 
access to financial resources, which might lead to better performance and hence better firm value. It is 
therefore interesting to explore whether the effects we have documented hold for both cross- and non-
cross-listed firms.  
We define an indicator variable CROSS which takes a value of 1 for cross-listed firms and a value 
of 0, otherwise. In model 3 of Table 5, we interact CROSS with our measures of financial resources (HRES) 
and growth prospects (HGRW) to explore whether the capabilities-performance relation we have 
documented is moderated by listing status. The results suggest that the positive relationship between 
growth prospects (HGRW) and performance is moderated by listing status, with the relation being weaker 
for cross-listed firms compared to non-cross-listed firms. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
significant at the 1% level. The interaction effect between HRES and CROSS is negative but not significant 
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(at the 10% level) suggesting that financial resources are important for all firms in this context, irrespective 
of listing status. In model 4 of Table 5, we explore the issue further by using SUR in line with Esqueda 
(2017). The results from SUR analysis suggests that the capabilities-performance relationship is stronger 
in non-cross-listed firms. As suggested by prior research (Esqueda, 2017; Foerster and Karolyi, 2000), 
compared to the non-cross-listed counterparts, cross-listed firms have access to external resources which, 
perhaps, reduces the need for significant internal resources and capabilities. This may thus explain the 
comparatively weaker relationship between internal capabilities and performance in this subgroup of 
firms. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
As shown in Table 1, our sample is unevenly distributed across countries with South Africa and 
Egypt contributing a majority of observations (i.e., 56% and 14%, respectively). For our second additional 
analysis, we exclude South African firms from our sample and explore the extent to which our main results 
are generalisable beyond the South African context. As shown in models (1) and (2) of Table 6, we find 
that our conclusions with respect to H1 are robust to the exclusion of South Africa. That is, financial 
resources and growth prospects are key determinants of firm performance in the African context. In model 
3, we find a positive relation between NGQ and aggregate performance (mROA) but this relationship is 
not statistically significant at the 10% level.  Nonetheless, in model 4, we find that the relationship between 
NGQ and individual performance (ROA) is positive and significant (at the 10% level) as expected (H2). 
In model 5, we again find that our main results in relation to our third hypothesis (H3) hold i.e., a positive 
relationship between individual firm performance (ROA) and the performance of peer firms (mROA). In 
model 6, we explore whether our results in relation to H4 hold in this subsample but do not find evidence 
in support.  
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Before drawing our concluding remarks, it is worth highlighting some of the strategies we have used 
throughout this study to ensure our findings are robust. Studies of this nature general suffer from 
endogeneity biases (i.e., omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error) hence we highlight the 
different ways we have addressed these issues. Firstly, in Tables 3 and 4, we have tested our hypotheses 
using different model specifications. For example, in Table 3, we present results for a panel fixed effect 
model specification with contemporaneous independent variables (model 1), a panel fixed effect model 
specification with lagged independent variables (model 2), a logit model specification (model 3) and a 
generalized method of moments specification (model 4). The fixed effect model specifications partly 
address problems of omitted variables while the use of lagged independent variables partly addresses the 
issue of reverse causality. Given that reverse causality is a major concern in research of this type, we also 
use a linear dynamic panel-data estimation technique, specifically, the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) specification to address this issue (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The model is estimated using an 
instrumental variable approach, where the lags and lag differences of the dependent and independent 
variables are used as instruments of the differenced and level equations. 
Secondly, we have explored our results and found them to be robust to alternative variable 
definitions. For example, in Table 3 (model 5) and Table 5 (model 1) we have used aggregated measures 
of financial resources (HRES) and growth prospects (HGRW) as alternatives to standard measures (FCF, 
LIQ, LEV, BTM, SGR and AGE) and we find that our results are robust to this alternative specification. 
Given than financial variables are generally skewed (Tunyi et al., 2019), we have used the median values 
as cut-offs when generating our dummy variables. We find that our results remain qualitatively similar 
and our conclusions do not change when we use mean values. We have computed our measure of NGQ 
using two different approaches i.e., principal component analysis (NGQC) and equal weighted index 
(NGQI). We find that these two measures are highly correlated (rho of 99.9%) and our findings are robust 
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to the use of either measure. When deriving the performance of peer firms (mROA), we have considered 
(1) all firms in a firm’s country and (2) all firms within a firm’s industry and country, as peers. Our results 
are robust to these alternatives. 
Finally, in all our regression analyses, we have considered several other firm- (e.g., inventory ratio, 
current ratio) and country-level (e.g., GDP per Capita, Patent, Resource Rent, Fuel Price, Average Wage, 
tax rate, R&D expenditures) control variables. We find that some of these additional control variables are 
highly correlated with other control variables and that their inclusion does not impact on our conclusions. 
For conciseness, we do not include these additional variables in our models. Beyond our core results, in 
untabulated results in Tables 4 and 5, for example, we also find that firm performance increases with stock 
market capitalisation (MCAP) and market volatility (MVOL) but declines with firm concentration 
(FConc). This suggests that active or developed stock or capital markets can play a role in enhancing firm 
performance. Our results on FConc, perhaps, capture the impact of competition on firm performance. That 
is, individual firm performance is dampened by the presence of other competing firms. These latter results 
for country-level control variables are suppressed for conciseness. 
5.0 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of findings and concluding remarks 
We argue that firm financial resources and growth prospects constitute critical resources for achieving 
competitive advantage and driving performance in the African context. Our empirical evidence is 
consistent with this hypothesis and holds for both strong and weak institutional environments. Firms that 
hold sufficient financial resources are better placed to shoulder added costs and risks of operating in this 
context. Such firms generally achieve comparatively better performance than their low-resource 
counterparts in both strong and weak institutional environments. Several African firms are cross-listed in 
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foreign markets giving them access to significant external resources. In support of our hypothesis, we find 
that the relationship between capabilities and performance is stronger for non-cross-listed firms (i.e., firms 
with comparatively limited access to foreign capital). Overall, our finding highlights the critical nature of 
financial resources and growth opportunities/prospects in shaping firm performance in the African 
context. 
From an institutional perspective, we also contend that firms in countries with better governance 
quality are also more likely to achieve superior performance than their counterparts in weak governance 
countries. Our underlying argument is that strong national governance encourages long-term investment, 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and reduces operating risk and costs. This is particularly important given 
the ease of capital movement across national borders in an increasingly globalised world. We find 
evidence that aggregate performance of all firms in the country, as well as, individual firms’ performance 
improves with the quality of governance at the macro-level. We also predict that firm performance 
increases with the performance of peer firms, perhaps, due to mimetic isomorphism, competition, and 
other spillovers. After controlling for firm- and country-level determinants of performance, we find some 
evidence to support this contention.  
Finally, our study explores whether governance quality moderates our earlier finding of a positive 
capabilities–performance relationship. Our argument is that firms’ internal capabilities (captured by 
financial resource availability and growth prospects) are more likely to translate to superior performance 
in strong governance environments. Consistent with this, we find evidence suggesting that NGQ enhances 
the translation of internal capabilities, particularly firm growth prospects, into firm performance. Linking 
these findings together, we conclude that governance quality impacts on the performance of individual 
firms directly (by enhancing firm growth prospects) and indirectly (by enhancing the performance of peer 
firms and by moderating the resource-performance nexus).  
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By way of extensions, our results can further explain several stylised facts. For example, it explains 
why firms in countries with strong NGQ will, on average, outperform firms in countries with a weak NGQ 
and why different firms within the same country will achieve different levels of performance despite 
sharing a similar institutional environment. It also explains why, in the long run, firm performance within 
a country can be expected to converge towards the mean. 
Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, as well as, alternative model and variable 
specifications. The fact that South African firms constitute a majority of firms in our sample might limit 
the generalisability of our findings beyond South Africa. To address this issue, we explore the extent to 
which our main results hold out of South Africa. We find that our main results generally hold beyond 
South Africa. Specifically, we find that financial resources and growth prospects are key determinants of 
firm performance in other African countries besides South Africa. Similarly, NGQ leads to better 
aggregate and individual firm performance outside South Africa. Nonetheless, our results on the extent to 
which NGQ moderates the capability-performance nexus beyond South Africa are not statistically 
significant. One potential explanation for this latter finding is that several African countries (besides South 
Africa) experience only small changes in the NGQ from one year to another and this might not be 
sufficient to drive marked increases in performance. 
5.2 Limitations 
In this study, we focus on two main internal sources (financial resources and growth opportunities) and 
one external source (NGQ) of competitive advantage. While we have attempted to control for several 
factors in our analysis, we do not argue that financial resources, growth prospects and governance quality 
are the only determinants of firm success in this context. There are opportunities to explore whether other 
firm characteristics, particularly internal corporate governance mechanisms, are critical for performance. 
We do not pursue this line of testing due to data restrictions. Nonetheless, our measures of growth 
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prospects, perhaps, also act as a noisy proxy for internal governance quality as firms with strong 
governance are more likely to have better growth prospects. While our measure of NGQ draws from 6 
widely used WGIs, there other measures such as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings and 
Distance to Frontier scores, which could be further explored. Again, we are unable to pursue this line of 
inquiry due to data restrictions.  
Prior studies have also suggested that access to financial networks, credit, information and 
technology could play an important role in shaping firm performance (Ramachandran and Shah, 1999; 
Biggs and Shah, 2006). The latter two studies use the World Bank’s enterprise surveys to collate their 
information for SMEs. While we do not explore this line of argument due to data unavailability for our 
sample, there are opportunities to further explore this in future research. Nonetheless, our use of a sample 
of public limited companies partly controls for this effect. Public limited companies are significantly larger 
than SMEs, and are likely to have better access to credit, information and technology than their SME 
counterparts. Hence, access to these resources might not result in competitive advantage at this level. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Measures of performance, capabilities and governance 
Panel A – Alternative measures of firm performance 
Variable Proxies Definition 
Return on 
assets 
ROA Net income to total assets. 
Average 
abnormal 
returns 
AAR Average excess monthly stock returns over the last 12 
months, measured against the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index 
Median return 
on assets 
mROA The median ROA (net income to total assets) of all firms 
(except the firm in question) in a specific country in each year. 
Dummy ROA>0 
[AAR>0] 
A dummy variable which takes avalue of 1 if a firm has a 
positive ROA [AAR] and a value of zero, otherwise. 
Dummy ROA>mROA 
[AAR>mAAR] 
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm’s ROA 
[AAR] is greater than the median ROA [AAR] in that year, and 
a value of zero, otherwise. 
Panel B –Measures of firm internal capabilities 
Variable Proxies Definition 
Financial 
resources 
FCF Free cash flow: Ratio of operating cash flow less capital 
expenditures to total assets 
LEV Leverage: Long term debt to total assets ratio 
LIQ Liquidity: Cash and equivalents to total assets ratio 
HRES HRES (high resource dummy) takes a value of 1 if a firm has 
LIQ and FCF above the country-year median and its LEV is 
below the country-year median. Otherwise, it takes a value of 0. 
Growth 
prospects 
BTM Ratio of total assets less intangibles to market value 
SGR Sales growth: Percentage change in sales  
AGE Number of days since incorporation/365 
HGRW HGRW (high growth dummy) takes a value of 1 if a firm’s SGR 
is above the country-year median and its BTM and AGE are 
below the country-year median. Otherwise, it takes a value of 0. 
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Panel C –Alternative measures of National Governance Quality 
Variable Proxies Definition  
National Governance 
Quality Index 
NGQI An index of indices (CCI, GEI, VAI, RQI, PSAVI, 
ROLI). Computed as the arithmetic mean of the above 6 
equally-weighted indices. 
National Governance 
Quality Composite 
NGQC A composite measure of governance quality derived 
through principal component analysis (PCA). Input 
variables include CCI, GEI, VAI, RQI, PSAVI and 
ROLI. 
Panel D –Firm control variables 
Variable Proxies Definition 
Tangible assets TANG Property, plant and equipment to total assets  
Firm Size SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Operating efficiency SALS Salary to sales: Total salary and benefit expense 
to net sales  
Cross-listing  CROSS 
 
Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm 
has a secondary listing outside its main (African) 
market, and a value of 0, otherwise. 
   
Panel E –Country control variables 
Variable Proxies Definition 
Market size LnGDP Natural log of GDP.  
GDP Growth GDPGr Percentage chang in GDP from previous year  
Market capitalisation MCAP Natural log of stock market capitalisation in USD 
Stock market volatility MVOL Market volatility is the average of the 360-day volatility 
of the national stock market index. 
Firm Concentration FConc Number of stocks traded on a country’s stock market as a 
proportion of total listed firms in Africa. 
Notes:  Data for estimating variables presented in Panels A, B and D is collected from Thomson DataStream. The 
dataset for Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) including Control of Corruption index (CCI), Government 
Effectiveness Index (GEI), Voice and Accountability Index (VAI), Regulatory Quality Index (RQI), Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence Index (PSAVI) and Rule of Law Index (ROLI) used in Panel C is compiled by Kaufmann et 
al. (2010). The data for Panel E is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). WDIs and 
WGIs are freely obtainable from the World Bank Group (Worldbank.org). 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics of firm-level variables 
 
 N Mean SD skewness p25 Median p75 
AAR 8,868 -0.003 0.040 -0.445 -0.025 0.001 0.023 
ROA 11,090 0.056 0.094 -0.492 0.013 0.053 0.112 
FCF 10,390 0.015 0.111 -0.422 -0.039 0.021 0.082 
LIQ 9,570 0.123 0.128 1.263 0.026 0.077 0.179 
LEV 11,023 0.294 9.728 102.631 0.013 0.109 0.263 
HRES 11,183 0.243 0.429 1.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BTM 8,825 3.894 5.665 2.421 0.773 1.647 3.966 
SGR 9,519 0.206 0.410 1.502 -0.001 0.123 0.294 
AGE 9,363 1.791 1.195 -1.978 1.245 2.109 2.576 
HGRW 11,183 0.128 0.334 2.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 11,111 13.829 2.356 0.125 12.067 13.748 15.522 
TANG 10,964 0.290 0.263 0.698 0.048 0.221 0.478 
SALS 6,823 0.170 0.404 29.283 0.061 0.127 0.204 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of African firms. Full variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 3: Collinearity diagnostics 
Panel A: Rho and VIF - firm variables 
 FCF LIQ LEV BTM SGR AGE SIZE TANG VIF1 
FCF         1.190 
LIQ 0.260*        1.260 
LEV -0.030* 0.025*       1.010 
BTM -0.062* -0.079* -0.008      1.020 
SGR -0.011 -0.010 -0.017* -0.042*     1.010 
AGE 0.087* -0.007 0.001 -0.009 -0.096*    1.040 
SIZE 0.117* -0.134* -0.022* 0.172* 0.027* 0.118*   1.130 
TANG -0.102* -0.326* -0.006 -0.108* 0.015 0.077* 0.028*  1.190 
SALS -0.086* -0.007 -0.001 -0.013 -0.030* 0.016 -0.054* -0.015 1.020 
 
Panel B: Rho and VIF- country variables 
 NGQI NGQC LnGDP GDPGr MCAP MVOL VIF2 VIF3 
NGQI       1.290 - 
NGQC 0.999*      - 1.280 
LnGDP -0.019 -0.002     2.640 2.610 
GDPGr 0.058 0.052 0.134    1.090 1.080 
MCAP 0.127 0.127 0.392* -0.123   2.080 2.080 
MVOL 0.297* 0.309* 0.579* -0.008 0.289*  1.660 1.660 
FConc 0.245* 0.251* 0.648* -0.020 0.699* 0.493* 3.760 3.740 
Notes: The table presents correlation coefficients (rho) and variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent and 
control variables. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. VIF1 refers to variance inflation factors 
computed using only firm-specific variables in Panel A. VIF2 and VIF3 are computed using only country variables 
in Panel B. We exclude NGQC when computing VIF2 and NGQI when computing VIF3. * indicates significance at 
the 10 percent level.  
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Appendix 4: Average of measures of NGQ across countries  
Panel A –Countries A to N 
 Botswana Egypt Ghana ICoast Kenya Mauritius Morocco Namibia 
CCI 0.966 -0.515 -0.083 -1.100 -0.950 0.511 -0.213 0.295 
GEI 0.537 -0.372 -0.040 -1.189 -0.579 0.773 -0.113 0.117 
PSAVI 0.992 -0.696 -0.024 -1.678 -1.244 0.822 -0.370 0.892 
RQI 0.543 -0.366 -0.061 -0.872 -0.213 0.734 -0.158 0.104 
ROLI 0.637 -0.100 -0.037 -1.349 -0.933 0.925 -0.103 0.170 
VAI 0.501 -1.019 0.314 -1.173 -0.339 0.837 -0.644 0.402 
NGQI 0.696 -0.511 0.011 -1.227 -0.710 0.767 -0.267 0.330 
NGQC 3.054 -1.644 0.211 -4.671 -2.645 3.329 -0.716 1.455 
Years 10 16 12 8 13 8 16 8 
Panel B –Countries N to Z and full sample 
 Nigeria SAfrica Tanzania Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe All 
CCI -1.110 0.339 -0.518 -0.055 -0.853 -0.660 -1.109 -0.352 
GEI -1.020 0.566 -0.509 0.348 -0.528 -0.778 -1.005 -0.258 
PSAVI -1.889 -0.142 -0.178 -0.004 -1.042 0.257 -1.132 -0.392 
RQI -0.902 0.502 -0.420 -0.036 -0.185 -0.472 -1.796 -0.251 
ROLI -1.249 0.089 -0.437 0.074 -0.396 -0.499 -1.524 -0.332 
VAI -0.754 0.657 -0.186 -0.989 -0.493 -0.325 -1.344 -0.322 
NGQI -1.154 0.335 -0.375 -0.110 -0.583 -0.413 -1.318 -0.318 
NGQC -4.419 1.575 -1.360 0.008 -2.050 -1.564 -5.147 -1.035 
Years 11 17 8 10 8 15 14 17 
Notes: The table presents means of measures of National Governance Quality (NGQ) across 15 African countries. 
The following abbreviations are used: Control of Corruption (CCI), Government Effectiveness (GEI), Voice and 
Accountability (VAI), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAVI), Regulatory Quality (RQI), Rule of Law 
(ROLI), National Governance Quality Index (NGQI) and National Governance Quality Composite (NGQC). Their 
full definition is provided in Appendix 1. All, presents the sample mean for each variable. 
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Appendix 5: Cases of top performers in weak institutional environments 
Firm mROA Years Principal shareholders (affiliations) 
Egypt    
*SIDI KERIR PETROCHEM. 23.4% 8 Suez Bags: Subsidiary of SUEZ Cement whose 
parent company is Heidelberg Cement. 
MISR: Of national interest as the Kuwaiti 
Egyptian Investment Company (investment 
holding company for Kuwaiti and Egyptian 
government) is a major shareholder. 
*ALEXANDRIA 
CONTAINERS 
23.4% 7 
*SUEZ BAGS 22.8% 7 
*MISR DUTY FREE SHOPS 22.0% 8 
*MISR CEMENT (QENA) 22.0% 7 
Ivory Coast    
*SAPH 20.9% 7 SAPH: Largely owned by Michelin Group. 
SONATEL: Controlling stake held by Orange 
SA. 
SOGB: Majority owned by SOCFINAF SA 
(Luxembourg) 
SIVOA: Majority owned by Air-Liquide SA. 
*SONATEL 17.2% 8 
*SOLIBRA 15.7% 7 
*SOGB 14.5% 7 
*SIVOA 9.9% 7 
Kenya    
*EAST AFRICAN 
BREWERIES 
19.7% 9 
East African Breweries: subsidiary of Diageo 
PLC. 
BAT Kenya: Subsidiary of British American 
Tobacco. 
Safaricom: Largely owned by Vodafone Group 
PLC. 
Bamburi cement: Subsidiary of LafargeHolcim. 
*NATION MEDIA GROUP 18.9% 8 
*BAT KENYA 17.9% 8 
*SAFARICOM 14.9% 10 
*BAMBURI CEMENT 14.8% 8 
Nigeria    
*NESTLE FOODS NIGERIA 22.8% 9 Nestle Nigeria: Subsidiary of Nestlé S.A 
Switzerland. 
Dangote Sugar Refinery: Subsidiary of Dangote 
Group. 
Nigerian Breweries; Largely owned by 
Heineken Brouwerijen BV. 
Guinness Nigeria: Subsidiary of Diageo PLC. 
 
*DANGOTE SUGAR 
REFINERY 
19.2% 6 
*NIGERIAN BREWERIES 17.3% 9 
*SC.IVOIRIENNE DES 
TABACS 
17.0% 7 
*GUINNESS NIGERIA 15.3% 8  
Notes: The table reports firm’s median return on assets (mROA) over a number of firm-years (Years). The firms included are 
the best performers in each market over the period (firm-years). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Distribution of sample by country 
Country Firms Total Obs. Prop. %  Country Firms Total Obs. Prop.% 
Botswana 17 120 1.07  Nigeria 106 653 5.84 
Egypt 217 1,570 14.04  South Africa 795 6,225 55.66 
Ghana 29 209 1.87  Tanzania 5 36 0.32 
Ivory Coast 29 192 1.72  Tunisia 53 362 3.24 
Kenya 54 387 3.46  Uganda 6 41 0.37 
Mauritius 41 296 2.65  Zambia 15 113 1.01 
Morocco 79 681 6.09  Zimbabwe 37 247 2.21 
Namibia 7 51 0.46  Total 1,490 11,183  
Notes: Firms denote the number of unique firms in the sample for each country. Total obs. (observations) denote the 
number of firm-year observations for each country. 
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Table 2: Firm internal capabilities and performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ROA>0 ROA>mROA AAR>0 AAR>mAAR 
Firm  
resources 
FCF 0.091*** 0.070*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
LIQ 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.007** 0.007*** 
LEV -0.777*** -0.289*** -0.124*** -0.152*** 
Growth  
prospects 
BTM -0.800*** -3.146*** -0.521*** -0.695*** 
SGR 0.147*** 0.080*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 
AGE 0.000 0.007 0.111*** 0.076*** 
Notes: The table presents univariate difference of means tests comparing the characteristics of well-performing and poorly-
performing firms. Our measure of performance is return on assets (ROA) and the average monthly abnormal return (AAR). 
The following abbreviations are used: free cash flow (FCF), liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), book to market ratio (BTM), 
sales growth (SGR), firm age (AGE) and median return on assets (mROA). Full definitions of these variables are provided in 
Appendix 1. In column (1), we compare the characteristics of loss-making (ROA<0) to those of profit-making (ROA>0) firms. 
In (2), we compare firms with ROA<mROA to firms with ROA>mROA. (3) and (4) are similar to (1) and (2) but here we use 
AAR as our measure of performance. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Firm-level characteristics and performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ROA ROA ROA>0 ROA ROA 
 (FE) (FE-Lagged IVs) (Logit) (GMM) (OLS) 
L.ROA    0.286***  
    (0.000)  
HRES(+)     0.058*** 
     (0.000) 
FCF(+) 0.189*** 0.127*** 6.624*** 0.149***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
LIQ(+) 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.563 0.055*  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.330) (0.073)  
LEV(-) -0.006*** -0.001 -1.620*** -0.006***  
 (0.000) (0.675) (0.001) (0.000)  
HGRW(+)     0.041*** 
     (0.000) 
BTM(-) -0.003*** -0.001** -0.045*** -0.004***  
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000)  
SGR(+) 0.039*** 0.022*** 1.134*** 0.034***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
AGE(-) -0.013*** -0.004 -0.216*** -0.012***  
 (0.000) (0.121) (0.003) (0.003)  
SIZE 0.004** -0.009*** 0.240*** -0.001 0.006*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.776) (0.000) 
TANG -0.082*** -0.022 0.022 -0.128*** 0.007 
 (0.000) (0.137) (0.941) (0.001) (0.196) 
SALS 0.002 -0.002 -0.503 0.007 -0.011 
 (0.505) (0.508) (0.675) (0.412) (0.204) 
CROSS   0.134  0.017*** 
   (0.431)  (0.000) 
Const. 0.047* 0.192*** -0.670 0.129* 0.024*** 
 (0.050) (0.000) (0.328) (0.084) (0.003) 
Obs. 4,266 3,650 4,266 3,306 6,811 
Rsquare 0.191 0.073   0.126 
#Panel 772 704  652  
Notes: The table presents regression results for determinants of performance proxied by return on assets (ROA). The 
independent variables in model 2 are lagged by 1 year. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. We run fixed effects 
(FE), dynamic generalised methods of moments (GMM), ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression (Logit) 
models. Expected signs are shown in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. In all models except (4), we control for industry, country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Firm performance, internal capabilities and governance quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 mROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
 (FE) (FE) (FE-Lagged IVs) (FE) (GMM) 
NGQC(+) 0.003** 0.009* 0.010*   
 (0.045) (0.062) (0.053)   
mROA(+)    0.575*** 0.606*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
L.ROA     0.302*** 
     (0.000) 
FCF(+)  0.177*** 0.117*** 0.185*** -0.009 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.718) 
LIQ(+)  0.093*** 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.038 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.291) 
LEV(-)  -0.006*** -0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.580) (0.000) (0.395) 
BTM(-)  -0.003*** -0.001* -0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.001) 
SGR(+)  0.036*** 0.022*** 0.034*** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.819) 
AGE(-)  -0.012*** -0.005* -0.011*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.078) (0.000) (0.873) 
Firm controls NO YES YES YES YES 
Country controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Const. -0.077 -0.039 0.021 -0.102 -0.086 
 (0.594) (0.773) (0.887) (0.409) (0.676) 
Obs. 143 3,653 3,351 3,976 2,786 
Rsquare 0.105 0.207 0.087 0.216  
#Panel  758 697 765 584 
Notes: The table presents regression results for determinants of performance. The dependent variable in model (1) is median ROA 
(mROA) and the dependent variable in models (2) to (5) is ROA. The firm controls in the model (suppressed for conciseness) include 
TANG, SIZE and SALS. Country controls in the model (suppressed for conciseness) include lnGDP, GDPGr, MCAP, MVOL and FConc. 
All variables are fully defined in Appendix 1. The independent variables in model 3 are lagged by 1 year. We run fixed effects 
(FE) and dynamic generalised methods of moments (GMM) models. Expected signs are shown in parenthesis. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: The impact of institutional environment and cross-listing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA  ROA ROA ROA 
 (FE) (SUR) (RE) (SUR) 
  Strong Weak  Non-CROSS CROSS 
NGQC * HRES 0.002**      
 (0.033)      
NGQC * HGRW 0.004**      
 (0.018)      
CROSS * HRES    -0.004   
    (0.389)   
CROSS * HGRW    -0.025***   
    (0.000)   
HRES 0.030*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.038*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HGRW 0.022*** 0.059*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.045*** 0.027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQC 0.019***      
 (0.000)      
CROSS    0.025***   
    (0.000)   
SIZE 0.000 0.010*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 (0.859) (0.000) (0.000) (0.308) (0.000) (0.002) 
TANG -0.081*** 0.006 0.020** -0.010* 0.016* 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.603) (0.023) (0.098) (0.071) (0.274) 
SALS -0.003 -0.024*** -0.050*** -0.008*** -0.027*** -0.109*** 
 (0.259) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.073*** -0.111*** -0.022* 0.054*** -0.035** 0.025 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.029) (0.154) 
Industry FE YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Country FE YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Year FE YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Observations 6,321 1,172 1,172 6,811 1,306 1,306 
R-squared 0.068 0.210 0.245 0.100 0.112 0.129 
Notes: Models (1) and (3) of the table present panel fixed (FE) and random effect (RE) regression results for determinants 
of firm performance (ROA). Models (2) and (4) present results from seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) exploring firm 
performance across two subsamples; strong and weak NGQ environments (in model 2) and non-cross-listed and cross-
listed firms (in model 4). See Appendix 1 for full variable definitions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
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Table 6: Main results without South Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ROA ROA mROA ROA ROA ROA 
 (FE) (FE) (OLS) (FE) (FE) (FE) 
HRES  0.017***    0.011*** 
  (0.000)    (0.004) 
HGRW  0.013***    0.008 
  (0.001)    (0.150) 
NGQC   0.002 0.009*  0.011*** 
   (0.228) (0.055)  (0.000) 
mROA     0.688***  
     (0.000)  
NGQC * HRES      -0.003 
      (0.130) 
NGQC * HGRW      -0.003 
      (0.260) 
FCF 0.070***   0.058*** 0.062***  
 (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000)  
LIQ 0.095***   0.066*** 0.078***  
 (0.000)   (0.007) (0.001)  
LEV -0.082***   -0.091*** -0.090***  
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  
BTM -0.002***   -0.001** -0.001**  
 (0.001)   (0.018) (0.011)  
SGR 0.016***   0.011** 0.009*  
 (0.001)   (0.027) (0.091)  
AGE -0.007***   -0.006** -0.007***  
 (0.001)   (0.017) (0.008)  
Firm controls YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Country controls NO NO YES YES YES NO 
Constant -0.050 0.079*** -0.096 -0.090 -0.482** 0.065*** 
 (0.207) (0.000) (0.587) (0.676) (0.032) (0.000) 
Observations 1,283 3,169 130 1,175 1,196 3,071 
R-squared 0.203 0.061 0.079 0.243 0.259  
Firmid 303 524  300 300 523 
Notes: The table presents panel fixed effects (FE) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for determinants of 
performance (ROA) and median performance (mROA). The firm controls in the model (suppressed for conciseness) include 
TANG, SIZE and SALS. Country controls in the model (suppressed for conciseness) include lnGDP, GDPGr, MCAP, MVOL and 
FConc. All variables are fully defined in Appendix 1. Expected signs are shown in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. In all models, we control for industry, country and year fixed 
effects. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: NGQ across African countries 
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Figure 2: Conceptual model 
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Figure 3: Mean performance of firms by country 
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Figure 4: Mean performance of top 5 firms by country 
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